This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on innovation and income inequality using a Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous households. We …nd that although strengthening patent protection and raising R&D subsidies have the same macroeconomic e¤ects of stimulating innovation and economic growth, they have drastically di¤erent microeconomic implications on income inequality. Speci…cally, strengthening patent protection increases income inequality whereas raising R&D subsidies decreases (increases) it if the quality step size is su¢ ciently small (large). An empirically realistic quality step size is smaller than the threshold, implying a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on income inequality. We also calibrate the model to provide a quantitative analysis and …nd that strengthening patent protection causes a moderate increase in income inequality and a negligible increase in consumption inequality whereas raising R&D subsidies causes a relatively large decrease in both income inequality and consumption inequality.
Introduction
The seminal study by Solow (1956) shows that economic growth in the long run must come from technological progress. The development of technologies in turn is driven by innovation and R&D. Therefore, patent protection and R&D subsidies are two important policy instruments that determine technological progress and economic growth. Since the development of the innovation-driven growth model by Romer (1990) , many studies have used variants of the innovation-driven growth model to explore the macroeconomic e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on innovation and economic growth. However, the microeconomic implications of these two policy instruments on the income distribution have received much less attention. Therefore, in this study, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on innovation as well as income inequality. We …nd that whether the relationship between innovation and inequality, which are both endogenous variables, is positive or negative depends on the underlying exogenous driving force (i.e., patent policy versus R&D subsidy).
The growth-theoretic framework that we consider is the Schumpeterian growth model. We extend it by allowing for heterogeneous households who have di¤erent levels of asset holdings. As Piketty (2014) argues, an unequal distribution of wealth is an important cause of income inequality. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we …nd that although strengthening patent protection and raising R&D subsidies have the same macroeconomic e¤ects of stimulating innovation and economic growth, they have drastically di¤erent microeconomic implications on income inequality. Therefore, it is important to consider beyond aggregate e¤ects and investigate distributional implications when evaluating the overall e¤ects of a policy instrument.
When a strengthening of patent protection or a raise in R&D subsidies leads to a higher rate of economic growth, the real interest rate also rises leading to an increase in asset income, which is the cause of inequality in the model. As a result, strengthening patent protection and raising R&D subsidies both have a positive e¤ect on income inequality via this interest-rate channel. Intuitively, the higher interest rate increases the income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor households. Furthermore, the two policy instruments carry an assetvalue e¤ect that a¤ects income inequality. By increasing monopolistic pro…ts, strengthening patent protection increases asset value and causes an additional positive e¤ect on income inequality. In contrast, raising R&D subsidies suppresses income inequality by reducing asset value through creative destruction 1 and consequently causing a decrease in asset income. As a result of the opposing interest-rate and asset-value e¤ects, raising R&D subsidies has an overall ambiguous e¤ect on income inequality. Speci…cally, if the quality step size is smaller (larger) than a threshold, then raising R&D subsidies leads to a lower (higher) degree of income inequality. An empirically realistic quality step size is smaller than the threshold implying a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on income inequality. In contrast, a strengthening of patent protection causes a positive e¤ect on income inequality. This theoretical result is consistent with the empirical …nding in Adams (2008) who uses an index of patent rights constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and …nds that strengthening patent protection has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on income inequality. Therefore, it may seem that pro-growth policies tend to worsen income inequality; however, our analysis shows that this may be true for patent policy but not so for R&D subsidies.
The above results are partly due to an implicit assumption that R&D subsidies a¤ect only new inventions whereas patent breadth a¤ects both new inventions and previously patented inventions, which are assets owned by households. This assumption is realistic because R&D subsidies only compensate …rms for carrying out new innovation whereas increasing patent breadth enhances protection for future and current patents. 2 It is also important to emphasize that the above results are not due to a common misinterpretation of the Schumpeterian model that innovation comes from entrants but not incumbents. Cozzi (2007) shows that the correct interpretation of creative destruction in the Schumpeterian model is that incumbents' choice of R&D is simply indeterminate, so that the aggregate economy behaves as if innovation is targeted only by entrants. In other words, creative destruction in the Schumpeterian model can be consistent with the empirical observation that incumbents often target innovation at their own industries.
We also explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on consumption inequality. We …nd that strengthening patent protection increases consumption inequality whereas raising R&D subsidies continues to have an overall ambiguous e¤ect on consumption inequality. Finally, we calibrate the model to investigate the quantitative e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on growth and inequality. The policy experiments that we consider are to increase separately the rate of R&D subsidies and the level of patent protection such that the R&D share of GDP increases by one-tenth in each case, which in turn leads to the same proportional increase in the equilibrium growth rate. We …nd that the increase in patent protection causes a moderate increase in income inequality and a negligible increase in consumption inequality whereas the increase in R&D subsidies causes a relatively large decrease in both income inequality and consumption inequality. These results are robust to a number of robustness checks.
This study relates to the literature on R&D and economic growth. The seminal studies in this literature are Romer (1990) , Segerstrom et al. (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) . Subsequent studies in this literature apply variants of the R&D-based growth model to explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on innovation and economic growth; 3 see for example Peretto (1998) Minniti and Venturini (2014) and Kiedaisch (2015) . These studies focus on a representative-household framework and do not consider the distributional implications 2 It is useful to note that patent breadth refers to how broad claims in patents are (or are expected to be) interpreted by patent judges in court. 3 Many empirical studies have investigated the e¤ects of these two R&D policy instruments. Recent examples include Minniti and Venturini (2017) , who …nd that R&D tax credits have positive e¤ects on productivity growth, and Brown et al. (2017) , who …nd that protection for intellectual property has positive e¤ects on R&D. Other studies such as Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) , Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008) , …nd that patent protection may have blocking e¤ects on future innovation. We do not consider blocking patents in this study; see for example Chu (2009), Chu et al. (2012) , Cozzi and Galli (2014) and Yang (2017) for an analysis of blocking patents in the Schumpeterian model. of patent protection and R&D subsidies. The current study …lls this gap in the literature by exploring the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on income inequality in addition to growth within a Schumpeterian model with heterogeneous households.
Some studies in the literature consider heterogeneous workers and explore the relationship between innovation and wage inequality. For example, Acemoglu (1998 Acemoglu ( , 2002 ) develops an R&D-based growth model with two R&D sectors and two types of workers to explore how the direction of innovation a¤ects the skill premium. Li (1998) and Grossman and Helpman (2016) also consider heterogeneous workers and wage inequality in an R&D-based growth model with a uniform distribution of workers' productivity in the former and a general distribution of workers'productivity in the latter. Some studies such as Spinesi (2011), Pan et al. (2012) and Cozzi and Galli (2014) analyze the e¤ects of patent protection on the skill premium. The present study di¤ers from these studies by considering wealth heterogeneity instead of worker heterogeneity and by exploring income inequality instead of wage inequality.
A small number of studies in the literature consider income and/or wealth heterogeneity in the R&D-based growth model. Representative studies include Chou and Talmain (1996) , Zweimuller (2000) , Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) , Aghion et al. (2015) and Jones and Kim (2017) . These studies focus on the relationship between income inequality and innovation. Our study complements these interesting studies by showing that if patent policy (R&D subsidy) changes, then the relationship between innovation and inequality would be positive (negative). Furthermore, we explore the e¤ects of policy instruments not only on income inequality but also on consumption inequality. Chu (2010) and Kiedaisch (2016) also explore the e¤ects of patent policy on inequality; however, they do not consider R&D subsidies. Therefore, this study generalizes the analysis in Chu (2010) and Kiedaisch (2016) by providing a comparative analysis of two popular policy instruments, which appear to have similar aggregate e¤ects but drastically di¤erent distributional implications. Furthermore, unlike Chu (2010) and Kiedaisch (2016) , we consider a lab-equipment innovation process under which R&D uses …nal goods (instead of labor) as input. Under the lab-equipment speci…-cation, strengthening patent protection causes the positive asset-value e¤ect in addition to the positive interest-rate e¤ect on income inequality. 4 The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies. Section 4 provides a quantitative analysis. Section 5 considers a number of extensions of the model. The …nal section concludes. 4 If we instead considered the knowledge-driven speci…cation under which R&D uses labor as the factor input, then the positive interest-rate e¤ect of both patent protection and R&D subsidies would still be present. However, the positive asset-value e¤ect of patent protection would be absent because the monopolistic-pro…t e¤ect would be exactly o¤set by the creative-destruction e¤ect in this case. As for the negative asset-value e¤ect of R&D subsidies, it is robust to either R&D speci…cation; therefore, our …nding on the di¤erent e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on inequality is also robust. See Section 5.1.
A Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous households
In this section, we extend the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model in Grossman and Helpman (1991), which is a workhorse model in the literature, to allow for heterogeneous households with di¤erent asset holdings. Furthermore, we consider two policy instruments, patent breadth and R&D subsidies, in order to perform a comparative policy analysis. We consider these two policy instruments in our analysis because they have the same implications at the macroeconomic level, which makes them easy to compare, by having the same e¤ects on innovation and economic growth but drastically di¤erent implications at the microeconomic level by having di¤erent e¤ects on inequality. Finally, we also modify the R&D speci…cation by assuming a lab-equipment innovation process as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). 5 
Households
There is a unit continuum of households indexed by h 2 [0; 1] with identical preferences over consumption c t (h) but di¤erent levels of asset holdings. Each household h has the following utility function:
The parameter > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Each household h supplies one unit of labor 7 to earn wage income and makes consumption-saving decision to maximize utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
a t (h) is the real value of …nancial assets (i.e., the share of monopolistic …rms) owned by household h. r t is the real interest rate. w t is the real wage rate. t 2 (0; 1) is the rate of a wage income tax collected by the government. 8 From standard dynamic optimization, the 5 In Section 5.1, we present an alternative version of our model with knowledge-driven innovation. 6 Here we consider a log utility function for simplicity. In the case of an isoelastic utility function, the positive interest-rate e¤ect of patent protection and R&D subsidies on income inequality would remain unchanged because the real interest rate would still be increasing in the equilibrium growth rate. As for the asset-value e¤ect on income inequality, it would still be di¤erent for the two instruments: patent protection would have a positive asset-value e¤ect whereas R&D subsidies would have a negative asset-value e¤ect on income inequality. 7 For simplicity, we assume inelastic labor supply in which case all households have the same labor income implying that labor income of an individual is independent of the individual's share of wealth in the economy. Under elastic labor supply, a negative relationship between wealth and labor income would emerge (Chu, 2010) , consistently with evidence -see the empirical studies summarized in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006) who also consider the relationship between growth and inequality but in an AK model. The growthinequality relationship in our model would continue to hold under elastic labor supply. 8 Alternatively, one can consider an asset income tax. Here we consider a wage income tax for two reasons. First, it is non-distortionary and does not a¤ect aggregate equilibrium allocations. Second, if we …nanced R&D subsidies by a tax on asset income -which is the source of inequality in the model -then raising R&D subsidies would cause an additional negative e¤ect on inequality, which would reinforce our …nding of a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on inequality.
Euler equation is given by
which shows that the growth rate of consumption is the same across households such that
Final good
Competitive …rms produce …nal good y t using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods:
where
where p t (i) is the price of x t (i).
Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries, which are also indexed by i 2 [0; 1], producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods.
In each industry i, there is a monopolistic industry leader, who holds a patent on the latest technology and dominates the market until the arrival of the next innovation. 9 The production function of the leader in industry i is
where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of each quality improvement, n t (i) is the number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t, and l t (i) is the amount of labor employed in industry i. Given the productivity level z nt(i) , the marginal cost function of the leader in industry i is w t =z nt(i) . From Bertrand competition, the pro…t-maximizing price is a constant markup over the marginal cost such that
where the markup z is a policy parameter determined by the level of patent protection in the economy. 10 Given (7), the amount of monopolistic pro…t in industry i is
9 See Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of this Arrow replacement e¤ect. 10 The presence of monopolistic pro…t attracts potential imitation; therefore, stronger patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without losing their markets to potential imitators. This formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiro's (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price". and the wage payment in industry i is
where the second equality of (8) and (9) follows from (5).
R&D
Equation (8) 
The no-arbitrage condition that determines v t is
which states that the rate of return on v t must equal the interest rate. The return on v t is the sum of monopolistic pro…t t , capital gain _ v t and expected capital loss t v t , where t is the rate of creative destruction.
Competitive entrepreneurs devote R t units of …nal goods to R&D. The free-entry condition of R&D is
where the policy parameter s 2 (0; 1) is the rate of R&D subsidies and t v t is the expected return on R&D. We assume that t is an increasing function in R&D spending R t given by
where Z t is the level of technology in the economy and captures in a simple way increasing R&D di¢ culty due to an increasing-complexity e¤ect of technology. 12 Combining (11) and (12) yields
which shows that invention value v t is proportional to technology level Z t and that v t is decreasing in R&D subsidy s for a given Z t . Intuitively, for a given Z t , the free-entry condition implies that an increase in subsidy s makes R&D cheaper and leads to a decrease in the price of inventions. In equilibrium, this decrease in the value of inventions is caused by a higher rate of creative destruction. 11 We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) for a theoretical justi…cation for the symmetric equilibrium as the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model. 12 Venturini (2012) provides empirical evidence for the presence of increasing R&D di¢ culty.
Government
The government decides on the level of patent protection in the economy. Also, it collects tax revenue to …nance R&D subsidies and non-productive government expenditure G t subject to the following balanced-budget condition:
where G t = y t is assumed to be proportional to output. The parameter G t =y t 0 is the ratio of government expenditure to output.
Solving the model
In this section, we proceed to solve the model as follows. Section 3.1 de…nes the equilibrium. Section 3.2 shows that the aggregate economy always jumps to a unique balanced growth path and explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on the aggregate growth rate of the economy. Section 3.3 shows that the wealth distribution is stationary, and hence, it is exogenously determined by its initial condition. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 show that income and consumption distributions are also stationary, but they are endogenously determined by patent protection and R&D subsidies.
Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fc t (h); a t (h); y t ; x t (i); l t (i); R t g and a time path of prices fw t ; r t ; p t (i); v t g. Also, at each instance of time, the following conditions hold: households h 2 [0; 1] maximize utility taking fw t ; r t g as given;
competitive …rms produce …nal good y t to maximize pro…t taking prices as given; each monopolistic …rm i produces intermediate good x t (i) and chooses fl t (i); p t (i)g to maximize pro…t taking w t as given; competitive R&D entrepreneurs choose R t to maximize expected pro…t taking fw t ; v t g as given;
the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that
the market-clearing condition for …nal goods holds such that
the total value of household assets equals the value of all monopolistic …rms such that
Aggregate economy
Aggregate technology Z t is de…ned as
where the last equality uses the law of large numbers. From (9), we see that l t (i) = l t for all i 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, substituting (6) into (4) yields
where the second equality uses l t = 1. Di¤erentiating the log of Z t in (15) with respect to time yields the growth rate of technology given by
where t = 'R t =Z t from (12) . The following proposition shows that the aggregate economy jumps to a unique balanced growth path along which aggregate variables grow at the same rate as technology.
Proposition 1
The aggregate economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path along which variables fc t ; y t ; w t ; t ; v t g grow at the same rate as technology Z t .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given Proposition 1, we impose balanced growth on (10) to derive
where g denotes the steady-state growth rate of technology. Substituting (18) into (13) yields the steady-state arrival rate of innovation given by
where the second equality uses (8) and (16) . Therefore, the steady-state growth rate of technology is
Di¤erentiating (20) with respect to and s respectively yields
which show that a strengthening of patent protection and a raise in R&D subsidy s both lead to an increase in the technology growth rate g. These aggregate e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies are quite common in theoretical studies, such as Peretto (1998), Li (2001) and Chu (2011) , and also consistent with empirical studies, such as Brown et al. (2017) and Minniti and Venturini (2017) . The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is increasing in the level of patent protection and the rate s of R&D subsidies.
Proof. Equation (20) shows that g is increasing in and s.
Wealth distribution
At time 0, the share of assets owned by household h is exogenously given by a;0 (h) a 0 (h)=a 0 , which has a general distribution function f a with a mean of one and a standard deviation of a > 0. From (2), the aggregate value of …nancial assets evolves according to
where a t R 1 0 a t (h)dh is the total value of …nancial assets owned by all households. Combining (2) and (21) yields the law of motion for a;t (h) a t (h)=a t given by
which can be re-expressed as
where consumption share c;t (h) c t (h)=c t is a stationary variable. From (3), _ c t (h)=c t (h) = _ c t =c t , which in turn implies that _ c;t (h)= c;t (h) = 0 and that c;t (h) = c;0 (h) for all t > 0. Then, recall that the aggregate economy is always on the balanced growth path along which c t =a t and w t =a t are stationary. We will also show that the steady-state equilibrium tax rate is stationary. Therefore, (23) is a one-dimensional di¤erential equation, which describes the potential evolution of a;t (h) given an initial a;0 (h). In the appendix, we show that the coe¢ cient on a;t (h) in (23) is positive. Together with the fact that a;t (h) is a state variable, the only solution of (23) consistent with long-run stability is _ a;t (h) = 0 for all t, which is achieved by consumption share c;0 (h) jumping to its steady-state value shown in the appendix.
Proposition 3
For every household h, its asset share is constant over time and exogenously determined at time 0 such that a;t (h) = a;0 (h) for all t.
Proof. See the Appendix. Proposition 3 shows that as an equilibrium outcome, the initial wealth distribution remains unchanged over time. Therefore, the degree of wealth inequality is determined by the initial dispersion of asset holdings in the economy. However, as we will show in the next two sections, both the income distribution and the consumption distribution are endogenously determined, which in turn implies that the degrees of income and consumption inequality can be a¤ected by policy instruments, such as patent protection and R&D subsidies.
Income distribution
Before-tax income earned by household h is
Total before-tax income earned by all households is
Combining these two equations yields the share of income earned by household h given by
Let's begin by considering a simple distribution of a;0 (h). Suppose for now that there are just two types of household h 2 fE; W g. Households indexed by W are workers, who receive wage income but do not own any …nancial asset. In this case, the share of income owned by any household W is I;t (W ) = w t =(r t a t + w t ). Households indexed by E are entrepreneurs, who receive wage income and equally own all the …nancial assets. In this case, the share of income owned by any household E is I;t (E) = (r t a t =e + w t )=(r t a t + w t ), where e 2 (0; 1) denotes the mass of entrepreneurs among the unit continuum of all households. Income inequality measured by the relative income between an entrepreneur and a worker is I;t (E)= I;t (W ) = 1 + 1 e r t a t =w t , 13 which indicates two e¤ects of innovation on income inequality. First, I;t (E)= I;t (W ) is increasing in r t capturing the e¤ect of innovation via the interest rate on income inequality. Second, I;t (E)= I;t (W ) is increasing in a t =w t capturing the e¤ect of innovation via the value of assets (relative to wage) on income inequality. Putting these two e¤ects together, we have r t a t =w t , which captures the e¤ects of innovation on income inequality via asset income relative to wage income. 14 Let's turn to a general distribution of a;0 (h). Equation (26) implies that the distribution of income share at time t has a mean of one and a standard deviation of
which is increasing in r t a t =w t capturing the above-mentioned interest-rate and asset-value e¤ects of innovation on income inequality. From (3), we have r t = + g. From (13), we have v t = (1 s)Z t =', and we also know that a t = v t . From (9) and (16), we have w t = Z t = .
Substituting these conditions into (27) yields
for all t. Equation (28) implies that the distribution function f I of income share has a mean of one and a standard deviation of I . Here we measure income inequality by the standard deviation I of income share, which is equivalent to the coe¢ cient of variation of before-tax income.
15 Equation (28) shows that income inequality I is lower than wealth inequality a , and this …nding is consistent with the evidence documented in Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002) . Substituting the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g( ; s) from (20) into (28) yields
which is increasing in
. 16 Di¤erentiating with respect to and s yields
which is negative (positive) if 1 ln z > 0 (1 ln z < 0). 15 If we considered after-tax income, then the coe¢ cient of variation of after-tax income would be
For a given tax rate (which can be achieved by making endogenous to balance the government's budget constraint), the e¤ects of s and on g and I would be the same as the case of before-tax income. In the next section, we will explore how an endogenous tax rate responds to s and . 16 If we captured the e¤ects of education quality by ', then income inequality would be decreasing in education quality because a larger ' increases wage income relative to asset income despite its positive e¤ect on the interest rate. 17 It is useful to note that I > 0 requires (1 ln z)(1 s) + 1 ' ln z > 0, which in turn implies that
Proposition 4 The degree of income inequality is increasing in the level of patent protection but decreasing (increasing) in the rate s of R&D subsidies if ln z < 1 (ln z > 1).
Proof. Equation (29) shows that I is increasing in but decreasing (increasing) in s if 1 ln z > 0 (1 ln z < 0).
Recall that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g( ; s) is increasing in both and s. Equation (28) shows that an increase in g leads to an increase in income inequality I by increasing the real interest rate and asset income, which is the cause of income inequality in the model. This is the symmetric interest-rate e¤ect of patent protection and R&D subsidy s on income inequality I . However, these two policy instruments have an additional asset-value e¤ect on income inequality captured by the term (1 s) in (28) , and this assetvalue e¤ect is asymmetric between and s. To understand this asymmetric asset-value e¤ect, one can consider the ratio a t =w t = v t =w t = (1 s) =' derived from (9), (13) and (16) . Interestingly, a t =w t is decreasing in R&D subsidy s but increasing in patent protection . Intuitively, an increase in patent protection reduces the share of wage income as (9) shows and raises the share of pro…t income as (8) shows, thereby increasing asset income, which is heterogeneous across households and the source of income inequality in the model, relative to wage income. In contrast, an increase in R&D subsidies reduces asset income by decreasing the value of inventions as (13) shows. Therefore, while strengthening patent protection causes only positive interest-rate and asset-value e¤ects on income inequality, raising R&D subsidies carries both a positive interest-rate e¤ect and a negative asset-value e¤ect on income inequality. The positive interest-rate e¤ect is stronger when the quality step size is larger because @g=@s is increasing in the quality step size z as (20) shows. Equation (29) shows that if ln z is larger (smaller) than one, then a raise in R&D subsidies would have a positive (negative) e¤ect on income inequality. The empirical value of z is often considered to be less than 1.20; 18 see for example Laitner and Stolyarov (2013) . Therefore, under an empirically realistic quality step size, raising R&D subsidies has an overall negative e¤ect on income inequality.
The above results are driven by an implicit assumption that R&D subsidies a¤ect only new inventions whereas patent breadth a¤ects both new inventions and previously patented inventions, which are assets owned by households. The value of these assets is a t = v t = t =( + ) = 1 y t =( + ). Therefore, the value of assets relative to wage is a t =w t =
( 1)=( + ), which is decreasing in the rate of creative destruction . 19 Suppose we assume that patent breadth a¤ects only new inventions but not previously patented inventions. Then, before the arrival of new inventions, a larger patent breadth does not yet have a positive e¤ect via the markup on the value of existing assets and only causes a negative e¤ect on the value of assets by increasing the rate of creative destruction . In this case, the e¤ect of patent breadth is similar to the e¤ect of R&D subsidies until the arrival of new inventions at which point the positive e¤ect of the markup on a t =w t appears.
Consumption distribution
From (2), consumption by household h is
where the second equality uses (3) and the balanced-growth condition _ a t (h)=a t (h) = _ c t (h)=c t (h). Aggregate consumption is c t = a t + (1 )w t .
Combining (30) and (31) yields the share of consumption by household h given by
Equation (32) implies that the distribution of consumption share at time t has a mean of one and a standard deviation of
Following the same derivations as in the previous section, we obtain
where the steady-state equilibrium tax rate can be derived as follows by substituting (9), (12), (16) and (19) into (14):
which is increasing in s and . Substituting (35) into (34) yields
which is decreasing in
. Di¤erentiating with respect to and s respectively yields
which can be positive or negative. As before, we measure consumption inequality by the standard deviation of consumption share, which is equivalent to the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption. Equation (33) shows that consumption inequality c is independent of the interest rate because a higher interest rate leads to a higher saving rate such that consumption c t (h) is always a constant fraction of asset a t (h) due to the log utility function in (1). Therefore, unlike income inequality, the interest-rate e¤ect of patents and R&D subsidies is absent under consumption inequality. 20 Consequently, for a given tax rate , we are left with the asymmetric asset-value e¤ect of patents and R&D subsidies captured by the term (1 s) in v t =w t = (1 s) =' and in (34) . As in the case of income inequality, a strengthening of patent protection has a positive asset-value e¤ect on consumption inequality by raising asset income whereas an increase in R&D subsidies causes a negative asset-value e¤ect. However, the tax rate is also a function of and s. When either or s increases, R&D spending increases, which in turn leads to a higher tax rate as (35) shows and worsens consumption inequality c because the tax is levied on wage income w t rather than asset income, which is the source of inequality in the model. Therefore, strengthening patent protection increases consumption inequality due to the positive asset-income and tax-rate e¤ects whereas raising R&D subsidies has an overall ambiguous e¤ect on consumption inequality due to the negative asset-income e¤ect and the positive tax-rate e¤ect.
Proposition 5
The degree of consumption inequality is increasing in the level of patent protection but can be decreasing or increasing in the rate s of R&D subsidies.
Proof. Equation (34) shows that c is increasing in but can be decreasing or increasing in s.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to data in the US in order to provide a quantitative illustration on the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies. The model features the following aggregate parameters: f ; s; '; ; z; g. We set the discount rate to a conventional value of 0.05. We follow Impullitti (2010) to set the R&D subsidy rate s in the US to 0.188. We calibrate the value of R&D productivity ' by setting the time between arrivals of innovation to 1= = 8 years. 21 As for the patent protection level , we calibrate its value by setting the R&D share of GDP to R=y = 0:028. As for the quality step size z, we calibrate its value by setting the long-run growth rate g to 2%. Finally, the ratio of government spending to GDP is set to 0.2 as in Belo et al. (2013) . These empirical moments are representative of the US economy. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values. Under these parameter values, consumption inequality c is lower than income inequality 20 In the case of an isoelastic utility function, this neutral interest-rate e¤ect of the two policy instruments on consumption inequality would become ambiguous. Speci…cally, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution were less (greater) than unity, then the interest-rate e¤ect of the two instruments on consumption inequality would be positive (negative). As for the asset-value e¤ect on consumption inequality, it would still be di¤erent for the two instruments. 21 In The policy experiments that we consider are to increase separately the R&D subsidy rate s and the patent protection level such that the R&D share of GDP R=y increases by onetenth from 0.0280 to 0.0308 in each case, which in turn leads to the same proportional increase in the equilibrium growth rate. Table 2 reports the resulting implications of each of these policy changes on economic growth g, income inequality I and consumption inequality c . Table 2a shows that in order to increase the R&D share of GDP R=y by one-tenth, patent protection level needs to increase from 1.033 to 1.035, in which case the growth rate g increases from 2.0% to 2.2%. This increase in the growth rate leads to a corresponding increase in the interest rate, which in turn drives up income inequality I . In this case, the coe¢ cient of variation of income increases by 3.06%. 22 As for consumption inequality c , the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption increases negligibly by 0.36% because the positive interest-rate e¤ect is absent. Although the positive asset-value e¤ect remains and the positive tax-rate e¤ect appears, they are relatively minor in magnitude in the case of patent protection. Table 2b shows that in order to increase the R&D share of GDP R=y by one-tenth, the R&D subsidy rate s needs to increase from 0.188 to 0.242. The increase in the growth rate g is the same as above and gives rise to a positive interest-rate e¤ect on income inequality. However, the magnitude of the increase in s is large, which in turn gives rise to a strong negative asset-value e¤ect on income inequality I . In this case, the coe¢ cient of variation of income decreases by 3.95%. As for consumption inequality c , the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption decreases even more by 6.33% because the positive interest-rate e¤ect is now absent. Although the positive tax-rate e¤ect appears, its magnitude is relatively minor because R&D spending is a small share of GDP, and hence, the negative asset-value e¤ect remains the dominant force. Table 2c considers the case in which both policy instruments change simultaneously. Speci…cally, the level of patent protection increases from 1.033 to 1.035 as in case a whereas the rate of R&D subsidies increases from 0.188 to 0.242 as in case b. In this case, we …nd that the overall e¤ects are dominated by R&D subsidies such that the coe¢ cient of variation of income decreases by 0.90% whereas the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption decreases by 5.96%. This is due to the relatively large change in the R&D subsidy rate s. The smaller decrease in income inequality than before is due to the larger increase in the growth rate to 2.41%, which causes a larger interest-rate e¤ect on income inequality than before. 22 Here the change in income inequality I is reported as proportional change (i.e., In the rest of this section, we perform the following hypothetical experiments. In the US, the R&D share of GDP increases from 0.024 in 1995 to 0.028 in 2015. We use HP …lter to extract the trend of the R&D share of GDP from 1995 to 2015. Then, we consider two hypothetical scenarios. First, suppose the increasing trend of the R&D share of GDP is due to a gradual increase in the level of patent breadth. Then, we plot the resulting e¤ects on income and consumption inequality. Second, suppose the increasing trend of the R&D share of GDP is due to a gradual increase in the rate of R&D subsidies. Then, we plot the resulting e¤ects on income and consumption inequality. These results are summarized in the following …gure. Figure 1 simulates the percent changes in inequality and shows that if the increase in R&D were driven by a strengthening of patent protection, then income and consumption inequality would have increased by 4.10% and 0.47% respectively. If the increase in R&D were driven by an increase in R&D subsidies instead, then income and consumption inequality would have decreased by 5.68% and 8.81% respectively. 
Robustness check: R&D share of GDP
Starting from this section, we consider a number of robustness checks on our simulation exercise to illustrate how the numerical results would change under di¤erent assumptions. In this section, we examine data on the R&D share of GDP. As Comin (2004) argues, data on R&D expenditures reported by …rms may not capture all the resources devoted to innovation-related activities. Here we consider a rough exercise by doubling the R&D share of GDP from 0.028 to 0.056. Table 3 reports the re-calibrated parameter values and shows that because R=y is increasing in , the markup ratio increases from 1.033 to 1.068, which is a more realistic value. 23 The re-calibrated value of R&D productivity ' decreases because a lower R&D productivity is required (given a higher R&D spending R=y) in order to keep the innovation arrival rate at 0.125 as in the previous section. Table 4 shows that the increases in income and consumption inequality under patent protection become larger at 3.27% and 0.76% respectively whereas the decreases in income and consumption inequality under R&D subsidies become slightly smaller at 3.90% and 5.96% respectively. However, the qualitative pattern remains that income and consumption inequality increases under patent protection but decreases under R&D subsidies and that the magnitude of the changes under R&D subsidies is larger than under patent protection. Finally, when both instruments change simultaneously, the overall e¤ects are still dominated by R&D subsidies such that income inequality decreases by 0.64% whereas consumption inequality decreases by 5.19%. Therefore, our results are robust to considering biases in R&D share R=y. 
Robustness check: technology growth rate
In the previous sections, we calibrate the value of the quality step size z by targeting the long-run growth rate of output per capita in the US. It is equally reasonable to calibrate the value of z by targeting the long-run growth rate of technology instead. In this case, we re-calibrate the parameter values by setting g = 1%. (because a lower g = ln z implies a lower z) whereas other parameter values remain largely the same. Under the new parameter values, the long-run growth rate g increases by the same proportion of one-tenth from 1.0% to 1.1%. Table 6 shows that the pattern of changes in inequality is the same as before except that the increase in income inequality under patent protection becomes smaller at 2.11% whereas the decrease in income inequality under R&D subsidies becomes larger at 5.00%. Finally, when both instruments change simultaneously, the overall e¤ects continue to be mostly driven by R&D subsidies such that income inequality decreases by 2.91% whereas consumption inequality decreases by 5.19%. The decrease in income inequality is larger than in the previous section because the increase in the growth rate is now smaller, which in turn implies that the positive interest-rate e¤ect is also smaller. In any case, our results are robust to considering biases in the growth rate g. 
Extensions of the model
In this section, we consider a number of extensions to the benchmark model in order to explore the robustness of our results. In Section 5.1, we change the lab-equipment innovation speci…cation to the knowledge-driven innovation speci…cation under which R&D uses labor as the factor input. In Section 5.2, we change the quality-ladder model to a variety-expanding model.
R&D labor
We now assume that R&D uses labor instead of …nal good as the factor input. Under this assumption, (12) is modi…ed as follows:
In this case, the free-entry condition of R&D becomes
where the second equality uses (37) . Substituting (8) , (9) and (18) into (38) yields
where l x denotes production labor. Substituting (37) and the resource constraint l x + l r = 1 into (39) yields the equilibrium R&D labor given by
which is increasing patent breadth and R&D subsidy s. Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g = ln z = (' ln z)l r ( ; s) is also increasing in and s.
From (27) , the standard deviation of before-tax income share is
where the relative value between assets and wage is given by a t =w t = (1 s)=' from (38) . Therefore, an increase in the level of patent breadth leads to a higher degree of income inequality via only the interest-rate channel r = +g. The asset-value e¤ect a t =w t = (1 s)=' of patent breadth is now absent because the monopolistic-pro…t e¤ect and the creativedestruction e¤ect of exactly cancel each other in this case. In contrast, an increase in the rate of R&D subsidies has both positive and negative e¤ects on income inequality. The positive e¤ect arises via the interest-rate channel r = + g whereas the negative e¤ect arises via the asset-value channel a t =w t = (1 s)='. In other words, although the positive assetvalue e¤ect of patent breadth becomes absent when R&D uses labor as the factor input, the overall e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on income inequality remain the same as before. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When R&D uses labor as the factor input, the degree of income inequality is increasing in the level of patent protection but decreasing (increasing) in the rate s of R&D subsidies if z is below (above) a threshold. Proof. Substituting a t =w t = (1 s)=' and g = (' ln z)l r into ( + g)a t =w t yields
where l r ( ; s) is given by (40) . Equation (42) implies that ( + g)a t =w t is increasing in but decreasing (increasing) in s if z is su¢ ciently small (large). Then, recall from (41) that I is increasing in ( + g)a t =w t .
Variety expansion
We now consider a variety-expanding growth model to examine the robustness of our results. To begin, we replace the Cobb-Douglas production function of …nal good in (4) by the following CES production function:
where the parameter " 2 (0; 1) determines the elasticity 1=(1 ") of substitution between intermediate goods. Then, we replace the production function of intermediate goods in (6) by a simple one-to-one production function x t (i) = l x;t (i). In this case, the familiar pro…t-maximizing price of x t (i) is given by p t (i) = w t =". To introduce patent breadth, we introduce a patent policy parameter such that p t (i) = minf ; 1="gw t . In this case, the amount of pro…t earned by intermediate good x t (i) is given by It can be shown that the equilibrium features symmetry such that l x;t (i) = l x;t =N t for all i 2 [0; N t ]. In this case, the production function in (43) simpli…es to
which implies that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of output is g y = g N (1 ")=". As in Section 5.1, we consider the knowledge-driven innovation speci…cation under which R&D uses labor such that
In this case, the free-entry condition of R&D is given by
where the second equality uses (46) . The no-arbitrage value of an invention on the balanced growth path is given by
where the second equality uses (3) and the steady-state equilibrium condition g c = g y . It can be shown that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of t is given by g = g y g N . 26 Therefore, we have v t = t =( + g N ), which shows that for a given t , the value v t of an invention is decreasing in the growth rate g N of varieties. Intuitively, more varieties in the future will reduce the market share of each invention and lower its present value.
To solve for the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g N of varieties, we substitute (44) and (48) into (47) to obtain
where g N = 'l r . Substituting the resource constraint l x + l r = 1 into (49) yields
which is increasing patent breadth and R&D subsidy s. Therefore, the steady-state output growth rate g y = g N (1 ")=" = 'l r ( ; s)(1 ")=" is also increasing in and s.
The standard deviation of before-tax income share is
where the relative value between assets and wage is given by a t =w t = N t v t =w t = (1 s)=' from (47) . Therefore, an increase in the level of patent breadth leads to a higher degree of income inequality via only the interest-rate channel r = + g y . In contrast, an increase in the rate of R&D subsidies has both positive and negative e¤ects on income inequality. The positive e¤ect arises via the interest-rate channel r = +g y whereas the negative e¤ect arises via the asset-value channel a t =w t = (1 s)='. As in the knowledge-driven quality-ladder model in Section 5.1, although the positive asset-value e¤ect of patent breadth is absent, the overall e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on income inequality remain the same as before. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7
In the variety-expanding model, the degree of income inequality is increasing in the level of patent protection but decreasing (increasing) in the rate s of R&D subsidies if " is above (below) a threshold.
Proof. Substituting a t =w t = (1 s)=' and g y = 'l r ( ; s)(1 ")=" into ( + g y )a t =w t yields
where l r ( ; s) is given by (50) . Equation (52) implies that ( + g y )a t =w t is increasing in but decreasing (increasing) in s if " is su¢ ciently large (small). Then, recall from (51) that I is increasing in ( + g y )a t =w t .
Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of innovation policies, such as patent protection and R&D subsidies, on innovation and economic growth as well as income inequality, which is often neglected by studies in the literature. We have shown that policy instruments may have similar aggregate e¤ects on innovation and economic growth but very di¤erent distributional e¤ects on inequality. Speci…cally, we …nd that strengthening patent protection causes a moderate increase in income inequality and consumption inequality whereas raising R&D subsidies causes a relatively large decrease in both income inequality and consumption inequality. These results suggest that if the objective of a government is to enhance economic growth and reduce inequality, then the government should raise R&D subsidies instead of (or at least in combination with) strengthening patent protection. In our analysis, we have focused on a non-distortionary tax instrument. Considering more realistic distortionary tax instruments may lead to additional insights and di¤erent implications on before-tax and after-tax income inequality.
In this study, we have considered a Schumpeterian model with heterogeneity in household asset holdings. Our model focuses on asset income inequality instead of wage income inequality for two reasons. First, wage inequality in the form of skill premium has received much attention in the literature, but only a relatively small number of studies have considered asset income inequality in the Schumpeterian growth model. Second, empirical studies, such as Atkinson (2000 Atkinson ( , 2003 and Piketty (2014) , have shown that inequality in asset income is playing an increasingly important role. 27 Finally, although our model does not feature tangible assets such as physical capital, intangible assets are an important part of the modern economy. 28 Proof of Proposition 1. From (8), (9) , (13) and (16), we have
which shows that fy t ; w t ; t ; v t g grow at the same rate as technology Z t . We also know that the value of inventions equals the value of assets such that v t = a t ; therefore, a t also grows at the same rate as technology Z t . Recall from (17) that the growth rate of Z t is _ Z t =Z t = t ln z. In the rest of this proof, we will show that t jumps to a unique and stable steady state, so that _ Z t =Z t also jumps to its steady-state value. From (12), we have
where the second equality uses y t = c t +R t +G t , y t = Z t and G t = y t . If we de…ne t c t =Z t , then t = '(1 t ), which shows that the dynamics of t is solely determined by the dynamics of t . Taking the log of t and di¤erentiating it with respect to time yield
where the second equality uses (A1). Recall from (3) that _ c t (h)=c t (h) = _ c t =c t . Then, substituting (3) and (10) into (A3) yields
where the second equality uses (A2). Substituting (8), (13) and (16) into (A4) yields
where we de…ne a composite parameter '(1 ) + ' 1 s 1 , which is assumed to be positive by imposing parameter restrictions.
29 Equation (A5) shows that the dynamics of t is characterized by instability, so that t must jump to its unique and saddle-point stable steady state given by = ='. At the steady state, c t and Z t grow at the same rate given by g = ln z = '(1 ) ln z = ['(1 ) ] ln z as in (20) . 29 Otherwise, t and c t would be negative.
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting (9), (13) , (16) 
which also uses t c t =Z t . Recall from (3) that _ c t (h)=c t (h) = _ c t =c t , which in turn implies _ c;t (h) = 0 for all t. Substituting c;t (h) = c;0 (h) and t = =' for all t into (A6) yields 
Therefore, the coe¢ cient on a;t (h) in (A7) is positive, which in turn implies that _ a;t (h) = 0 for all t is the only solution of (A7) consistent with long-run stability. Finally, imposing _ a;t (h) = 0 on (A7) yields the steady-state value of c;t (h) given by c;0 (h) =
Equation (A9) shows that @ c;0 (h)=@ a;0 (h) > 0 given > '(1 )= .
